Adapting Arms Control for a New Era of Threats
Imagine a research lab indistinguishable from countless legitimate facilities worldwide. Here, scientists quietly modify an influenza virus, creating subtle changes that increase transmissibility while reducing susceptibility to antiviral medications. The work is buried in civilian research funding structures, never published, and hidden behind legitimate vaccine research. To outside observers, nothing appears unusual, yet the foundations of a clandestine bioweapons program are being established right under our noses 1 .
This scenario, while hypothetical, illustrates the profound challenge of controlling biological weapons in the 21st century. Unlike nuclear weapons with their specific fissile materials and massive production facilities, biological weapons can be developed from an enormous range of pathogens—anthrax, plague, influenza, coronaviruses—in spaces ranging from industrial fermenters to modest university labs. The very technologies that promise breakthroughs in medicine and public health can also be twisted to destructive purposes, creating what experts call the "dual-use dilemma" 1 3 .
In this article, we'll explore how arms control is adapting to these emerging threats, the revolutionary technologies that could help verify compliance, and the ongoing battle to prevent biology from becoming the next frontier of warfare.
The use of diseases as weapons is not a modern invention. Historical records show that as early as 600 BC, infectious diseases were recognized for their potential impact on people and armies 2 .
Tartar forces besieging the city of Caffa (now Feodosia, Ukraine) catapulted plague-ridden corpses over the city walls, possibly contributing to the Black Death pandemic that swept through Europe 2 .
British forces at Fort Pitt gave smallpox-contaminated blankets to Native Americans during Pontiac's Rebellion, hoping to spread the disease among tribes 2 .
Japan established the infamous Unit 731 in Manchuria, where thousands of prisoners died from experimental infections with plague, anthrax, and other pathogens 2 .
These historical incidents shared a common characteristic: they relied on naturally occurring pathogens and relatively crude delivery methods. The 20th century, however, brought revolutionary changes with the development of modern microbiology and genetic engineering, making possible the isolation, production, and modification of specific pathogens on an unprecedented scale 2 .
| Time Period | Event | Agent Used |
|---|---|---|
| 1346 | Tartar forces catapult plague victims into Caffa | Plague |
| 1763 | British distribute smallpox-laden blankets to Native Americans | Smallpox |
| World War I | Germany allegedly uses glanders and anthrax | Glanders, Anthrax |
| World War II | Japan's Unit 731 conducts experiments on prisoners | Plague, Anthrax, Cholera |
| 1984 | Rajneesh cult contaminates salad bars in Oregon | Salmonella |
| 2001 | Anthrax letters sent in the United States | Anthrax spores |
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1975 effectively prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons. It was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction 7 . Yet fifty years later, verifying compliance remains exceptionally difficult for several fundamental reasons:
A state could choose from hundreds of potential pathogens—anthrax, plague, smallpox, tularemia, hemorrhagic fever viruses—each with different production requirements. There is no single "signature" of a biological weapons program 1 .
Unlike nuclear programs requiring massive infrastructure, biological weapons can be developed in small, concealable facilities. A sophisticated program might occupy only a few rooms yet produce devastating weapons 1 .
The same activities can represent peaceful research or weapons development. "Tweaking an ordinary influenza virus" might be legitimate vaccine research or weapons development, with the difference lying entirely in intent 1 .
These challenges were evident from the beginning. The 1925 Geneva Protocol only banned the use of biological weapons in war, not their development or possession 2 5 . When the BWC was negotiated, the difficulties of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate activity were so pronounced that intrusive onsite verification was deemed politically unacceptable 1 .
In response to these challenges, scientists and arms control experts are developing a sophisticated multi-layered approach to biological weapons verification. Rather than relying on a single "silver bullet," they're combining traditional methods with cutting-edge technologies:
Researchers can now mine oceans of open-source data—social media posts, preprint scientific papers, patent applications, research funding patterns—to establish baselines of normal biotechnology activity in a country. Sudden changes, such as a research institution's publishing rate dropping markedly or unusual procurement patterns, can trigger further investigation 1 .
These are voluntary data exchanges where countries share information about their biological research activities. While currently limited—60-70% of potential warning signs wouldn't be captured—they establish what "normal" looks like for each country over time, making anomalies more visible 1 .
To understand how analysts might detect clandestine bioweapons programs, researchers at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists conducted a fascinating thought experiment using "acquisition pathway analysis"—a methodology borrowed from nuclear safeguards 1 .
The researchers developed three plausible scenarios for a modern biological weapons program 1 :
For each scenario, they identified the observable "signatures" such a program would leave behind, then assessed whether current monitoring systems would detect these signs.
The analysis revealed significant gaps in current monitoring capabilities. Depending on the scenario, 60 to 70% of potential warning signs would not be captured by existing confidence-building measures 1 .
For instance, a program using computer modeling (in silico) to select toxins wouldn't be detected because current monitoring focuses on physical work in maximum containment labs. Even if a program progressed to producing and weaponizing toxins within a properly declared maximum containment lab, by the time it was honestly reported in annual submissions, it would be too late to disrupt the weapons development 1 .
| Program Type | Observable Signs | Current Detection Capability |
|---|---|---|
| Large-scale state program | High energy consumption, specialized equipment procurement, large-scale material transfers | Moderate - some material transfers might be captured |
| Technologically advanced small program | Unusual research funding, procurement of advanced synthesis machines, shifts in publishing behavior | Low - most signs not captured |
| Clandestine targeted effort | Unexplained outbreaks, suspicious lab accidents, rumors from scientific staff | Very low - relies on intelligence |
This experiment demonstrated that what matters is not any single "smoking gun" but the pattern of disparate signs aligning in ways that don't fit a purely civilian purpose. A country suddenly stopping publication in biodefense research while quietly diverting funds to opaque containment labs reveals much through the change itself 1 .
The front lines of biological weapons control involve sophisticated technologies for detection, analysis, and medical response. Here are key tools in the modern biodefense arsenal:
| Tool/Technology | Function | Example Applications |
|---|---|---|
| ENVI Assay System | Compact immunoassay "lab-in-a-box" for early threat detection | Provisional identification of biological threats in field conditions 5 |
| Genomic sequencing | Determines complete genetic code of pathogens | Distinguishing natural outbreaks from engineered ones; identifying weaponized strains 1 |
| Replicon RNA vaccines | Rapidly-developed vaccine platform | Single-dose Sudan virus vaccine shown to protect guinea pigs; potential for rapid response to novel threats 8 |
| Nanolipoprotein particles (NLPs) | Vaccine platform showing enhanced protection | NLP-based vaccine demonstrated complete protection against aerosolized Y. pestis (plague) in mice 8 |
| Microbial forensics | Analyzes microbial evidence to identify sources | Attribution of biological attacks; distinguishing natural from deliberate outbreaks 1 |
| Hyperspectral sensors | Detects chemical signatures in environment | Identifying traces of biological agent production in waste streams 1 |
The future of biological weapons control lies in layered approaches that combine broad, low-intrusion monitoring with targeted, higher-intrusion follow-ups 1 . This might involve:
To capture more relevant research and procurement data, including reports of trade in sensitive equipment and more emphasis on laboratories capable of viral and peptide synthesis 1 .
Systematically into verification considerations 1 .
For rapid investigation of suspicious disease outbreaks, whatever their cause 7 .
Worldwide, since capacity to detect and respond to natural disease outbreaks also provides protection against biological attacks 7 .
The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored our global vulnerability to biological threats, whether natural or deliberate. Some nations appear to have concluded that "biological weapons provide an effective covert tool that can be wielded as part of hybrid warfare strategies or as a relatively cheap strategic deterrent" 5 .
Controlling biochemical weapons in the 21st century requires adapting Cold War-era treaties to address CRISPR gene editing, AI-driven pathogen design, and synthetic biology. The task is immense, but so are the stakes. As the technologies become more accessible, the international community must develop more sophisticated ways to distinguish peaceful research from weapons development and to verify that the life sciences remain dedicated to healing, not harm.